



**Director of  
Central  
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**Top Secret**

# **National Intelligence Daily**

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SITUATION REPORTS

AFGHANISTAN-USSR

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Baluchistan

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tribal leaders in Pakistani Baluchistan believe that the time is near when they can try for independence for both Pakistani and Iranian Baluchis. They are encouraged by the disorders in Iran and by the expectation that the USSR will put pressure on Pakistan from Afghanistan. Pakistani armed forces have been able to contain serious rebellions in the past, but the chiefs believe that either Soviet help or the diversion of Pakistani troops to meet Soviet pressure on the Afghan border would give them their opportunity.

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For the time being, the tribal chiefs are taking their lead from moderates and are waiting to see what the Pakistani Government does about events in Afghanistan. This policy could change easily, however. Some of the most important tribes are headed by radicals, and all tribal leaders are under some pressure for action from their followers. On the other hand, [redacted] [redacted] the tribal leaders now see the Soviets and radical tribesmen themselves as a threat, and may do no more than use this threat to extract concessions from the Pakistani Government. [redacted]

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## IRAN

*Supporters of Ayatollah Shariat-Madari clashed with progovernment demonstrators in Tabriz again yesterday, and the city reportedly has been placed under martial law.* [redacted]

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[redacted] Shariat-Madari has the support of about two-thirds of the Azarbayjani population. Shariat-Madari's political party, however, suffers from a severe shortage of funds and from a lack of organization. As a result, most of its demonstrations are spontaneous. [redacted]

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[redacted] the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party has been supporting the progovernment forces in Tabriz. The Tudeh's support is consistent with its policy of backing Khomeini publicly while preparing its organizational base. [redacted]

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The growing violence in the provinces has kept the regime off balance. There is no sign that the government has any overall strategy for dealing with the unrest and it appears increasingly to be reacting ineffectually--a perception that is likely to encourage further dissidence. For his part, Ayatollah Khomeini appears to be increasingly isolated, and we have seen no evidence that he is aware of the reality of his deteriorating domestic situation. [redacted]

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## Iraq-Iran


Iraq appears to be trying to patch up its differences with Iran. In a conciliatory speech this week, Iraqi

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President Saddam Husayn disclosed that Baghdad has responded positively to a recent Iranian move to "normalize" relations. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Iraq is eager for better relations and is hopeful that the situation will improve across the board. [REDACTED]

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Iraq continues to aspire to replace Iran as the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf and is still giving aid to Iranian dissident groups. Saddam may have decided, however, to seek an improvement in relations now out of concern that continued friction is contributing to instability in Iran that will ultimately benefit radical Iranian elements and the USSR. [REDACTED]

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Iran remains concerned about Iraq's intentions.

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#### USSR

The Soviet Union yesterday indicated in a TASS dispatch that it will oppose a US motion to impose economic sanctions on Iran in the UN Security Council. The Soviets doubtless hope that placing themselves squarely on Iran's side will help mend their relations with Iran in particular and with other Muslim countries in general. The Soviets also are demonstrating to the US that Moscow has not been affected by Washington's recent actions against the USSR and that the USSR has the power to retaliate against important US interests. [REDACTED]

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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

RHODESIA: Status of the Cease-Fire

*British officials in Rhodesia term the cease-fire as "a comparative success," but they are concerned about the large number of insurgents who did not assemble.*

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
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In Mozambique, President Machel has called a meeting of the presidents of the Frontline States today in Beira, apparently because of growing concern that the UK's handling of the Rhodesian cease-fire is working to the disadvantage of the Patriotic Front. The presidents probably will emphasize the need for at least the appearance of Front unity as elections approach, but we expect that South African military involvement in Rhodesia will head the agenda. [REDACTED]

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Lord Soames announced on Sunday that the only South African troops remaining in Rhodesia were those on the north side of Beitbridge, guarding vital communication lines between the two countries. In the past, South Africa had allowed some of its skilled personnel to "resign" in order to join the Rhodesian security forces; during the past year such camouflaged tours had been extended to small infantry units and helicopters with crews. [REDACTED]

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NATO: Positions on Anti-Soviet Sanctions

*Divergent national positions and domestic constraints are preventing NATO members from forging a strong Alliance reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.* [redacted]

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The British have taken the most aggressive tack. The UK called for a special North Atlantic Council meeting to endorse specific British sanctions. [redacted]

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French policy toward the Soviets has hardened, but the French still see Afghanistan as an East-South rather than an East-West issue. France wants to preserve its special relationship to Moscow, and probably will insist that the Allies respond individually to the Soviet actions. [redacted]

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The Afghan crisis provides a serious dilemma for West Germany, whose ruling coalition came to power on its detente policies. Chancellor Schmidt realizes that a weak response would give the political opposition a potent election issue. If he responds too vigorously, however, he risks undercutting the validity of detente in the minds of West German voters. [redacted]

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Smaller allies are unlikely to support strong Alliance sanctions, but they probably will not resist or undermine unilateral actions by the US, the UK, or Canada. West European governments also probably would not oppose economic measures taken by the EC Commission against the USSR. [redacted]

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All allies agree that arms control talks with the USSR should proceed. The British and West Germans want NATO's Special Consultative Group on theater nuclear arms control to become a broad forum for SALT III consultation. The West Europeans assume that the USSR eventually will proceed with theater nuclear arms control, but they have not yet addressed the question of how such talks could take place if SALT III is not possible. [redacted]

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**SYRIA: Leadership Changes**

*Syrian President Assad's changes in government and party leadership are unlikely to ease the growing confrontation between his ruling Alawite Muslim sect and the majority Sunni community.* [redacted]

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Assad yesterday appointed Dr. Abd al-Rauf Qasim, the Governor of Damascus, to be Prime Minister and to form a new government. Qasim is a Sunni Muslim, a Baath Party ideologue, and one of 14 new members of the party's top command. [redacted]

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Few Syrians will be persuaded that the changes will lead to internal reforms, especially power sharing. The Sunni terrorists responsible for the widespread violence that has been occurring in Syria are unlikely to settle for anything less than abolition of Alawite rule. [redacted]

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EL SALVADOR: New Junta

*Although three left-of-center civilians have been named to the ruling five-man junta, the new government will have to adopt a clearer reform orientation and streamline decisionmaking if it is to succeed.* [REDACTED]

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Two of the appointees are nationally prominent Christian Democrats; the third is a little-known independent who will likely give the Christian Democrats a working majority against the two military officers who remained on the junta after last week's resignations--an arrangement that should facilitate policy decisions. Further concessions demanded by the Christian Democratic Party in return for its participation--a renewed military commitment to political and economic reform, the exclusion of private-sector representatives from top posts, the establishment of a dialogue with extreme-left popular organizations, and the formulation of a more sophisticated response to leftist violence--are calculated to sharpen the regime's center-left image and attract support for its programs. [REDACTED]

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Although military negotiators have not yet acceded to all these conditions, they recognize that cooperation with the Christian Democrats may be the only remaining opportunity for the military to form a broad-based, moderate government. To assuage military misgivings, the Christian Democrats have dropped their demand for the removal of Defense Minister Garcia, identified with last month's crackdown on leftist extremists. [REDACTED]

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Smooth cooperation between the military and the Christian Democrats will not readily be achieved. The withdrawal of other moderate-left parties and the refusal to appoint a business representative also will deprive the government of support from key sectors. Cabinet appointments, expected later this week, could repair some of these deficiencies, but the Popular Forum--a leftist coalition previously represented on the junta--will probably remain aloof and might renew its ties to the revolutionary left. [REDACTED]

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EAST AFRICA: Summit Meeting

A meeting in Tanzania last week between President Nyerere, Ugandan President Binaisa, and Kenyan President Moi did little to reduce tensions in the region, but the Presidents agreed to confer again next month. Nyerere, whose troops in Uganda are the country's principal security prop, is concerned about clashes involving remnants of Idi Amin's forces along the Sudanese-Ugandan border and about Kenyan-Ugandan border problems. The success of the meeting was limited in part by bad feelings between Moi and Binaisa, and by Moi's strong suspicions about Nyerere's influence in Uganda. Sudan and Uganda have attempted to ease border tensions, and Sudanese President Nimeiri, who was unable to attend the summit because of domestic concerns, apparently is willing to go to the next session. [REDACTED]

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ISRAEL: New Foreign Minister

The appointment as Foreign Minister of Knesset Speaker Yitzhak Shamir, an ultraconservative member of Prime Minister Begin's faction of the dominant Likud bloc, apparently will be announced soon. Coming shortly after the designation of another conservative as Finance Minister, the balance of cabinet forces will thus be tipped further in favor of those who support a tough stance in the Palestinian autonomy negotiations with Egypt. Shamir's elevation also will provide Likud hard-liners--who deeply distrust the more moderate Defense Minister, Ezer Weizman--with a credible alternative for the succession to Begin. [REDACTED]

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## SPECIAL ANALYSIS

### PAKISTAN: Reaction to Afghanistan

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*The Pakistani Government sees itself today as weak, isolated, and clearly threatened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistani officials believe that Soviet combat troops will soon be operating in Afghan border regions and that action against the insurgents will spill over into Pakistan. Despite their fears, Pakistan's military leaders are cautious about openly seeking US support.*

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Pakistani officials fear that once Afghanistan has been pacified, Moscow and Kabul will turn their attention to Pakistan. They see a possibility of an Afghan incursion into Pakistani areas along the border where Afghan refugees are concentrated, but they have a much greater fear of attempts to assist dissident tribesmen in Pakistan's border provinces.

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Pakistan's sense of isolation has been increased by Indira Gandhi's victory in India, which will rekindle the Pakistanis' fear of a Moscow - New Delhi alliance bent on destroying their nation.

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### Caution Toward US, USSR

In deciding whether to embrace US support, Pakistan's military leaders must take into account anti-US sentiment in Pakistan that they fear may be turned against the government by opposition political leaders. Pakistani leaders, moreover, view the US as undependable because of its termination of military assistance during Pakistan's wars with India and its opposition to Pakistan's nuclear policy.

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In the period before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistani leaders considered attempting to normalize relations with Afghanistan and the USSR. Even now, there is some sentiment in the government for keeping the Soviet option open. Senior foreign affairs adviser

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Agha Shahi, who is thought to hold this view, may be pressing the government to demand maximum commitments from the US in the hope of demonstrating that Washington cannot be counted on. [redacted]

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President Zia and most military leaders would prefer--in the best of worlds--to return to a close relationship with the US. Zia and other top officers are all anti-Soviet, and few of them believe that better relations with the Soviets would do more than buy time. They recognize that any longer term benefits would founder on the higher priority the USSR will--in a crunch--always give India. [redacted]

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#### Military Assistance

In recent years, Pakistani foreign policy has emphasized ties with Islamic and nonaligned nations--a policy that probably will continue. For Pakistan to establish close ties with the US again would require Washington's willingness to provide the military equipment Pakistan believes it needs to assure its security. The Pakistanis believe a military aid package must contain sophisticated weaponry, preferably including A-7 aircraft--previously denied them by Washington. [redacted]

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There probably would be little give in Pakistan's position on the nuclear issue. The Pakistanis believe strongly that a nuclear capability is critical for Pakistan to become a secure and important Third World power. There is no dispute over this objective in Pakistan--Zia's opponents also support it--and any compromise on it, regardless of other aid from the US, would meet strong public opposition. [redacted]

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Zia would probably regard a joint Sino-American effort to resupply and reequip his forces as a particularly attractive proposal. The Pakistanis are heavily dependent on their relationship with China. If they are to risk incurring Soviet wrath, they would like to have their two great-power allies united behind them. The popularity of China among Pakistanis would also be a useful counter to their generally critical attitude toward the US. [redacted]

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The conclusion of a US military assistance program with Pakistan would cause a furor in India. Indira Gandhi can be expected to launch a vigorous campaign against new arms deliveries to Pakistan even though India's armed forces are overwhelmingly superior to Pakistan's, both in equipment and numbers of personnel. [REDACTED]

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